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COST-BENEFITS OF ADVANCED SOFTWARE:
A REVIEW OF METHODOLOGY USED AT KSC
By
Prafuila Joglekar
Abstract
To assist rational investments in advanced software, a formal, explicit, and multi-
perspective cost-benefit analysis methodology is proposed. The methodology can be
implemented through a six-stage process which is described and explained. The current
practice of cost-benefit analysis at the Kennedy Space Center is reviewed in the light of
this methodology. The review finds that there is a vicious circle operating. Unsound
methods lead to unreliable cost-benefit estimates. Unreliable estimates convince
management that cost-benefit studies should not be taken seriously. Then, given external
demands for cost-benefit esthnates, management encourages software engineers to some
how come up with the numbers for their projects. Lacking the expertise needed to do a
proper study, courageous software engineers with vested interests use ad hoc and
unsound methods to generate some estimates. In turn, these esthnates are unreliable, and
the vicious circle continues. The proposed methodology should help Kennedy Space
Center to break out of this vicious circle.
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COST-BENEFITS OF ADVANCED SOFTWARE:
A REVIEW OF METHODOLOGY USED AT KSC
By
Prafulla Joglekar
Executive Summary
Advanced software (ASW) investment decisions are multi-stage, varied, complex,
risky, and controversial. Therefore, we need a systematic methodology to assist rational
ASW investment decisions. I propose a formal, explicit, and multi-perspective cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) methodology for this purpose. I outline a number of rich concepts
and principles of this methodology, and reconunend a six-stage process for its
implementation. In the light of this methodology, my review of the current practice of
CBAs at KSC finds that the practice is seriously deficient.
The basic cause underlying these deficiencies is that we are caught in a vicious
circle described by the following paragraph:
At present, CBA studies fail to capture all the relevant concerns. They measure only
selected costs and benefits using questionable assumptions and unsound methods. As
a result, the estimated costs m_d benefits are highly unreliable. Consequently,
management looks at CBAs not as decision-making tools, but as mere exercises in
generating numbers for external justification of decisions already made. Thus,
management does not take CBA studies seriously, and simply leaves the conduct of
CBAs up to the initiative of the software engineers involved in specific projects,
without any provision for additional resources and expertise needed for these studies.
Lacking resources, and the necessary expertise in economic analysis, but with vested
interests in justifying their projects, courageous software engineers use creative, but
ad hoe and unsound methods to conduct their CBAs. The resulting cost-benefit
estimates are highly unreliable, and certainly not worthy of use in any rational
decision-making. Thus, management's view that CBAs are to be used merely as
exercises in generating numbers for external justification is reinforced, and so on.
The vicious circle continuesl
I recommend that at KSC, we should try urgently to break out of this vicious
circle. The methodology I have proposed provides one exit point to break out of this
circle. The other exit point is a change in management's perception of what a good
methodology can do, and its willingness to provide adequate resources and appropriate
expertise to the conduct of CBAs.
232
..
.
.
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION
THE PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
Richness of the methodology
A Clarification of Some Common Misperceptions
A Process for Implementation
Implementation Requirements and Advantages
A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT PRACTICE AT KSC
The Vicious Circle
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REFERENCES
gag 
4
4
5
6
11
12
13
16
17
ATFACHMENT A
ATI'ACHMENT B
A'ITACHMENT C
ATTACHMENT D
EXCERPTS FROM A CBA OF SCAN
REPLATFORMING
CBA FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF KATE
EXCERPTS FROM A CBA OF GPSS
RUBICON COST ANALYSIS STUDY
A-1
B-1
C-I
D-I
233
Abbreviations and Acronyms List
ASW
CBA
CEA
CUA
DTA
GPSS
G&A
KATE
KSC
LRU
RP
RUBICON
SCAN
TA
Advanced Software
Cost Benefit Analysis
Cost Effectiveness Analysis
Cost Utility Analysis
Decision Tree Analysis
Ground Processing Scheduling System
General and Administrative overhead costs
Knowledge-based Autonomous Test Engineer
Kennedy Space Center
Link Replaceable Unit
Rapid Prototyping
Reasoning Based on Intelligent Computer Operations and Networking
Shuttle Connector Analysis Network
Technology Assessment
L /
234
COST - BENEFITS OF ADVANCED SOFTWARE:
A REVIEW OF METHODOLOGY USED AT KSC
1. Introduction
Advanced software (ASW) projects axe exciting. They keep us at the cutting-edge
of teclmology; they help us develop and challenge the best minds in software
development; they promise to capture the knowledge and expertise of the brightest and
the most experienced personnel in tile space program; they promise to minhnize the
chance of a human error while maxhnizing the chance of rapid trouble shooting ha a
nch count-down; and in general, they have the potential to help improve the
lau ...... and efficiency of the operations at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) With theelleCtlVene:_ " "
national focus on US competitiveness, we are also looking forward to ASW projects that
promise commercial spin-offs.
As exciting as these promised benefits are, software development alone does not
ensure actual realization of those benefits. Often many other necessary conditions must
be obtained. For example, software such as Knowledge-based Autonomous Test
Engineer (KATE) and Reasoning Based on Intelligent Computer Operations and
Networking (RUBICON) will not enable us to actually reduce the manpower at the
Firing Room consoles until management is willing to deviate from the traditions and
practices that have clearly worked in the past, but that may be inferior and costly in the
future compared to the use of these ASW.
On the other hand, advanced software development is not necessary to obtain
certain improvements in operations efficiency. One well-known problem of today's
computer systems is that their true potential is seriously under-utilized. For example, we
are nowhere near realizing the reductions in hard-copy costs that are possible with the
electronic communication capabilities already ha place. Thus, detractors of ASW often
suggest that what we need is not more investment in ASW, but more investment in the
training and in the management of a change in people's attitudes and habits necessary for
a fuller exploitation of the existing technology. Of course, proponents of ASW counter
that exploiting even a small fraction of the potentially huge benefits of an ASW project
may be well worth the costs of its development. Clearly, we need to identify the optimal
mix of resources to spend on ensuring fuller use of existing technology and on
developing new ASW.
In addition, there axe a variety of interesting and challenging issues to resolve in
ASW investment decisions. Given many ideas for ASW projects and linaited resources at
. must decide which ideas to pursue and at what level of funding. By their very
hand. we • , . - ........ n-lete and carry the risks of tectmical,
natUdu eASrWo Per?aJt_oCtnSa;_a_ul?e%:Se,:v 'es1 tment_ecisions pertaining to an ASW projectsche , P " " " '
are not simple one-shot, yes-or-no type decisions, but multi-stage decisions requiring a
reassessment and redesign of the project at various stages in its life cycle. Below are a
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few examples of the many interesting and challenging issues one has to deal with when
making ASW inves.nent decisions.
Some projects, such as the replatfonning of the Shuttle Connector Analysis
Network (SCAN), seem unavoidable given the obsolescence of the current platform. Yet,
replatfonning opens several possibilities for enhancements to current SCAN capabilities
(e.g., LRU trace-through, Automated retest, Wire trace diagnostics, etc.), and total
project costs depend upon the enhancements we decide to seek. We would be foolish not
to exploit some of these opportunities for enhancements. However, the larger the set of
enhancements we seek, the greater would be the project complexity and the consequent
risk of failure. Thus, the real issue to be decided here seems to be what specific
enhancements to seek and what not to.
Some projects, such as the Ground Processing Scheduling System (GPSS), seem
to deserve continued funding on the basis of their past and measurable successes.
However, the issue here may be who should fund it from this point on, and at what level?
If GPSS's benefits are clearly demonstrable and the costs of its further development will
be lower than its future benefits, is it time to spin it off as a commercial venture7 Under
' this approach, a private firm will have to fund GPSS's further development and share in
the rewards of its future success. Thus, a larger portion of Code C budget may be
available to fund other ASW projects which may be too risky for a private (and risk-
averse) entrepreneur but quite acceptable to a (risk-neutral) government. On the other
hand, because of the many complicated legal and political issues involved, attempts to
commercialize GPSS too soon could actually slow down its development and
implementation.
Other ASW projects such as KATE, and RUBICON seem to deserve continued
funding because they are based on truly visionary technologies. The issue here is whether
these ASW projects represent a situation of "a solution looking for a problem to solve,"
and whether given our desire for being at the cutting-edge of technology, funding of
visionary technologies is justified in and for itself.
Another issue pertaining to KATE and RUBICON seems to be the threshold level
of funding needed to keep these projects at a reasonably productive pace. For some
projects, no funding at all may be better than some funding below the threshold level.
One concern is that with the speed at which some ASW projects are proceeding, there
may be cheaper and better commercial products on the market long before our
development is complete. Considering that possibility, the question is: Are we simply
providing taxpayer-funded software development experience to the contractor?
When funding an ASW project (See Attachment A), we seem to budget for the
time software engineers would spend on that project. In reality, the project uses many
other resources in the organization. Computer hardware, and office supplies are the
obvious examples of these. In addition, there are many hidden costs (hidden until we
recognize them). For example, to the extent that ASW projects attempt to capture
corporate knowledge and expertise, they require substantial time and cooperation from
......a
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various experts. Unless these experts' thne is explicitly budgeted for tile ASW project,
project schedule and success may depend on the goodwill of the experts, a,ld may even
risk neglect of the experts' normal duties which may be launch-critical today. Unless all
relevant costs of an ASW project are uncovered, added-up, and compared with the
project's likely benefits, one does not know whether that ASW development would be a
wise idea.
At the same time, it should be realized that if the experts are not convinced of the
value of the project, or think that their jobs will be at risk once their expertise is captured,
software engineers will not succeed in capturing their expertise. In other words,
successful implementation of an ASW project often requires that each one of the many
stakeholders of the project should find it cost-beneficial from his/her own perspective.
In short, ASW investment decisions are multi-stage, varied, complex, and risky,
and their success depends on the cooperation of multiple stakeholders. It is no surprise
that while there are a few success stories, there are many more instances of project
failures, long delays, and wasted resources. Thus, most ASW investment decisions seem
to be controversial. It is therefore imperative that we develop a systematic methodology
to assist rational ASW investment decisions.
In Section 2, I propose a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) methodology to assist these
decisions. I had hoped to demonstrate the use of this methodology in a couple of actual
decision situations. Unfortunately, at KSC the concept of what a CBA methodology can
do, and where to apply it, seems to be very different than mine. At KSC, CBAs are used
to justify past decisions, or our preferred choices, to some external constituency. CBAs
are not seen as an assistance to decision-making. Indeed, ASW projects that are facing
serious decision points seem to avoid a systematic CBA. As a result, I did not really get a
chance to demonstrate the use of my methodology. On the other hand, as is clear from
the discussion in Section 2, I did have the opportunity to study several instances of the
current practice of CBA at KSC. Attachments A through D present the relevant excerpts
from the CBAs I studied. In section 3, I review the current practice as a whole and
contrast it with nay methodology. Section 4 provides my conclusions and
recommendations.
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2. The Proposed Methodology
Rational decision-makers always assess the costs, benefits, and risks of the
alternative choices they have. However, this assessment is often informal, implicit, and
oldy from a single (the decision-maker's) point of view. I recommend that at KSC the
assessment of ASW investment alternatives be formal, explicit, and multi-perspective.
Organizational decision-makers clearly recognize the need for a formal process of
assessment. An explicit assessment forces us to articulate all underlying assumptions and
verify their validity. An explicit process is also easier to study, improve over time, and
pass on from one generation of decision-makers to the next. Many researchers suggest
that a cost-benefit assessment be "objective." I believe that costs and benefits of an ASW
lie in the "eye of the beholder." In other words, assessments, by their very nature, depend
upon one's point of view, and hence are subjective. Instead of attempting to avoid this
subjectivity, I recmmnend that the assessment be from the point of view of each one of
the major stakeholders of an ASW investment. As I have suggested before, such a multi-
perspective assessment improves our chances of obtaining full cooperation from all the
stakeholders, and hence the chances of project success.
Rational decisions based on such a formal, explicit (therefore well documented),
and multi-perspective assessment need no further efforts to justify them to our superiors
or to the general public.
2.1 Richness of the Methodology
Fomml CBAs have been done for over ninety years now, ever since the 1902
Harbor Act required that Army Corps of Engineers could build only those water projects
that could be shown to generate more money than they consumed. Given the language of
the Harbor Act, the loci of early CBA were on
(i) justifying a decision already made, and
(ii) quantifying all costs and benefits in dollar terms.
In many organizations, these foci continue to prevail even today. However, over
the years, as CBAs are done in a wide variety of organizations analyzing a wide variety
of decision situations, the CBA methodology has evolved considerably. In a previous
publication [1], I have reviewed this evolution, and clarified a number of common
misunderstandings about what a CBA methodology is, and is not.
Briefly, by now, we recognize that although a CBA can be used to justify a
decision already made, its most cost-effective use lies in arriving at the right decision.
We know that not all cost and benefits can be measured in dollar terms, if they can be
measured at all. We have developed a variety of techniques such as cost-effectiveness
analysis (CEA), cost-utility analysis (CUA), and technology assessment (TA) to
accommodate variables that defy measurement and valuation in dollar terms. More
hnportantly, we recognize that rational decisions can be made without forcing a
quantification of the non-quantifiable, or a prediction of the unpredictable. I see fl,ese
insights and teclmiques as an integral part of what I call "the CBA mefllodology."
-,,..i-
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The most fundamental principle of the CBA methodology is to account for (not
necessarily quantify) all incremental costs and benefits resulting from a decision
alternative. To enable us to do this task properly, the methodology provides a number of
rich concepts and principles. For example, it describes the many different types of costs
and benefits we may encounter, including: direct and indirect; tangible and intangible;
fixed and variable; controllable and non-controllable; one-time and recurrent; etc. The
methodology emphasizes the need to account for the opportunity cost of an action. The
principle is to count the net benefits we would have reaped had we taken the best
alternative action instead of a given action, as a cost of the given action.
The methodology tells us to pay attention to the cause-effect as well as the multi-
producer-single-product relationships as may be present, and to attribute benefits and
costs to the causes or the producers, as appropriate. It incorporates concepts and tools to
adjust for the associated risks and uncertainties. In analyzing a multi-year stream of costs
and benefits, the methodology provides us with teclmiques for converting these multi-
year flows to comparable and consistent units, so that we do not "confuse apples for
oranges". In short, the methodology is very rich and insightful.
2.2 A Clarification of Some Common Misperceptions
Unfortunately, in the information systems literature, some scholars have
incorrectly equated CBA methodology with such f'mancial teclmiques as internal rate of
return or present value calculations. While accounting for the thne value of money is an
huportant principle of CBA methodology, the methodology is much broader in its scope
than the narrow techniques it may use in specific analytical situations. I want to
emphasize that I am recommending a methodology, not a single technique.
A methodology includes not only a toolkit, but also an understanding of the
situations where each tool is most appropriate to use. Self-examination and hnprovement
are integral parts of a methodology. Thus, answers to questions such as "Is cost-benefit
analysis beneficial'/ Is cost-effectiveness analysis effective?" are legitimate parts of the
methodology [2]. We recognize that some times, the benefits of conducting a formal
and explicit CBA are not worth the time and costs required. The proposed methodology
welcomes a formal, explicit, and rational decision not to pursue a CBA in such situations.
The methodology also requires that the scope and the level of detail of a CBA
study be consistent with the magnitude of the likely costs of a wrong choice in an ASW
investment decision, and with the time available for decision-making. A CBA study that
costs $10,000, when the largest possible difference between the net benefits of the best
and the worst choice is only $5,000, does not make any sense. Similarly, a study that
takes a year to complete will not assist a decision that must be made within a month.
Thus, in my view, a common fear, namely that a CBA will cost too much and take too
long, is simply a misperception of the methodology.
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One widely-held belief is that a CBA is useful only when a project is initially
approved or disapproved, and it has no role to play in subsequent decisions about annual
funding levels, etc., particularly so, if an original CBA was not conducted at the time of
initial project approval. Once the methodology proposed here is in place, there will be no
reason to assume that a CBA with properly defined scope aud level of detail cannot assist
the current year's funding decision pertaining to an on-gohlg project, whether an initial
CBA exists or not.
Of course, when an initial CBA does exist, the analysis in subsequent years is
considerably easier. This is so because under my methodology, the initial CBA for an
ASW project, incorporating Rapid Prototying (RP) and anticipating a three year
development cycle, would include a decision tree analysis (DTA) of the year-by-year
alternative possible milestones of accomplishments and subsequent choices. Such a DTA
spells out precisely what to do, once we know which one of the various possible
milestones actually occurred during the previous year.
Perhaps the most pervasive misconception of the CBA methodology is that it
accounts only for the "economic" costs and benefits, and ignores the many non-economic
values we seek. With that misconception, some people even suggest that a CBA has no
role to play in any govermnent agency, let alone NASA, since govermnent agencies exist
precisely because market forces fail to provide for certain non-economic societal needs. I
have shown elsewhere that economists in general, and CBA methodologists in particular,
have always concerned themselves with the capture of the non-economic values [1]. The
methodology I am proposing insists that all values, economic and non-economic, be
captured, and captured explicitly. When this methodology is hnplemented, perhaps its
greatest contribution may lie in the clarification of the real values at KSC, in such trade-
offs as between obtaining assured launch success using existing (and proven) technology
and developing ASW for more efficient and effective launch operations in the future.
2.3 A Process for Implementation
With this overall framework in mind, I propose that at KSC, we use the six-stage
process depicted in Figure 1 for assessing various ASW investment alternatives.
Stage 1 requires that the decision context of a CBA study be articulated
explicitly. That is, we must identify the decision alternatives to be evaluated in as
specific tenns as possible. For example, in the SCAN replatforming project (See
Attaclunent A), evaluating the costs and benefits of the total replatfonning effort does
not help any decision, since in face of the obsolescence of the current platfonn,
replatforming must be done. What we need is an assessment of the incremental costs and
benefits of each enhancement sought while replatforming. We must still assess the costs
and benefits of the basic (no enhancements) replatforming effort, but only to set the base-
line from which the incremental costs, benefits, and risks of an enhancement can be
assessed.
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Figure 1
A Process for Applying CBA Methodology to ASW Investment Decisions
7
¢J3
"10
Q..
"lO
r"
Q
LL
<
"l
J
Stage 1: Context Articulation
Identify available decision alternatives
Identify all stakeholders
Guesstimate upper and lower bounds
Define Horizon
List assumptions
NO >
Record reasons for
future
Stage 2: Enumeration
of these changes: in all pertinent organizations, e.g."
[ Sponsoring Department /
._ Software Development GroupJ| Other directorates
_, Contracting Organization
Use of resources ]
information Input/output l ,-
NASA Mission Pedormance _"
Contractor Pedormance j
and Risks (technical, schedule, operational)
during development of ASW and after implementation
Stage 3: Measurement
Key issues: Proper base-lines
joint-use of resources
co-producers
NO i
Provide clear and
complete
description
NO
Stage 4: Valuation
Account for each stakeholder's point of view
Resolves issues such as contract terms to determine proper values
Accommodate alternative valuation metrics
and Sensitivity analysis with IStage 5: Adjustments for:
time value of money, alternative assumptions I
risks, I
probabilities of existence of the co-producers J
-i
Provide clear and
complete
I Stage 6: Final Assessment
Combining the valued and the unvalued lrom multiple perspectives,
management should: O approve/disapprove projects
o recommend redesign of ASW
o provide feedback to CBA methodology
description
f
241
In addition, in this Context Articulation Stage, we identify all the major
stakeholders of an ASW project, define the horizon (one year, or five years, etc.) over
which benefits and costs will be assessed, guessthnate the upper and lower bounds on the
costs and benefits of each alternative, and make decisions on which alternatives will be
the subject formal CBA studies, and from which stakeholders' points of view. In other
words, we make a judgment on which CBA studies would be cost-beneficial.
It is important to define a reasonably long but limited horizon. For example, it
does not help any decision we can make today, if we assess the costs and benefits KATE
assuming final completion and hnplementation of the total KATE vision, which is
esthnated to need $27M in software engineers' thne alone. At the current funding level of
$300K, it will take ninety years to realize that visionl (See Attachment B).
In the Context Articulation Stage, we should also begin to compile a list of
assumptions underlying our study. In subsequent stages, we should be diligent in
updating this list, as necessary.
Stage 2 requires the enumeration (or listing) of all the categories of changes
resulting from an investtnent in an ASW altemative, both during the development of the
ASW and after it is operational, but without going beyond the defined horizon. These
changes may be in:
(i) the use of resources including hardware, facilities, labor (both software engineers'
time, and supporting experts' time), etc.,
(ii) information input and output including quantity, quality, speed and timing,
(iii) NASA's mission performance including on-schedule and safe launches, maximum
productive use of available resources, being at the cutting edge of technology and
providing commercial spin-offs, etc., and
(iv) Contractor performance including profitability, productivity, etc.
We want to enumerate these changes not only in the sponsoring department (e.g.,
a vehicle flow manager in the case of GPSS), and the software development group, but
also in the various non-sponsoring but potentially affected directorates and contractors.
As suggested before, this may be important in obtaining the necessary cooperation from
the experts in various affected organizations, without risking a neglect of their normal
duties.
In addition to the above changes, we should also enumerate the technical,
schedule and operational risks associated with an ASW project. Also, we should not
forget to update the list of assumptions we began to compile in Stage 1. Indeed, as
depicted by the feedback arrows in Figure 1, I visualize the six stages of this process to
be overlapping, earlier stages requiring feedback and updating from later stages, and vice
versa.
In short, Stage 2 ensures that we account for all costs, benefits, and risks of an
ASW project, and their timings, within the defined horizon. It also ensures that
hmneasurable costs, benefits, and risks remain as prominent in our analysis as the
..._,...
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measurable ones. After all, making a decision (in Stage 6) inevitably involves a trade-off
between the measured and the unmeasured.
Once the relevant changes are enumerated, it is important to identify those that
defy any measurement (e.g., the quality of information), describe them as clearly and
completely as possible, and determine if they are still amenable to valuation (perhaps
through such approaches as the user's willingness to pay).
When feasible, measurement that occurs in Stage 3 is an important prelhninary
to valuation. However, even in the case of the measurable, such as the reduction in
scheduling meeting durations attributable to GPSS (See Attachment C), we must have a
proper historical base-line measurement, and the ability to project that base-line into two
futures, one with GPSS hnplemented, and one without. Just because in the pre-GPSS
environment, we used to schedule a meeting for an hour, and we used to invite 106
people to this meeting, does not mean we can use 106 hours per day as the base-line.
We must examine as to how long these meetings actually used to last, and how many
people used to actually attend.
If nothing else, Stage 3 tells us what data we must begin to collect, so as to track
the performance hnprovements brought about by an ASW. In projecting the without-
ASW future, it is important to not assume a simple status quo from the history. We must
examine as to what other forces may be influencing the base-line. For example,
experience ha scheduling past Orbiter flows may also help reduce the scheduling meeting
durations necessary for future flows.
Shnilarly, a reduction in weekend overthne, claimed as a benefit of GPSS (See
Attactunent C) may also be the result of a simple management policy to not approve
certain types of overthne work regardless of what it does to the launch schedule, and the
result of improved logistics and operations technologies in OPF. What is important is to
isolate and measure the incremental contribution of GPSS to this reduction in overtime.
It is important in the measurement stage to identify the many co-producers (i.e.,
necessary conditions) a proposed ASW may need in producing a benefit. For example, to
realize the savings in Firing Room manpower afforded by KATE or RUBICON (See
Attachments B and D), a co-producer is the necessary cultural and attitudinal change in
LCC management. When such co-producers are identified, one must estimate their
probabilities of existence during each year of the defined horizon, and then in Stage 5,
make the necessary adjustments to the measured or valued annual benefits, by
nmltiplying the benefits with these probabilities. Thus, if the likelihood of a cultural
change is zero, the expected benefits of manpower reduction due to KATE and
RUBICON will be zero.
Another issue in the measurement of ASW project benefits is whether several
projects are claiming the same benefits. For example, both KATE and RUBICON may
be claiming the same reductions in the Fixing Room manpower.
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On the cost-estimation side, a similarly complicating issue is one of the joint use
of same resources (e.g., tile sanle computer and communications hardware) by many
different projects. We need to develop a systematic method for identifying the
incremental changes in these resources brought about by each ASW project.
Costs are often assumed to be easier to measure than benefits. However, in
identifying exactly what costs are incremental, there are many issues that need to be
resolved particularly in the contract management envkomnent at KSC. If contractor
compensation is based on head-count, will not the savings in direct labor on one task
(brought about by an ASW) be shnply "absorbed" (at least, in terms of their accounting)
by some other tasks7 If demonstrated savings will be accomplished only in future years
through prudent contract negotiation, such a contract negotiation should be identified as a
co-producer of those savings.
In Stage 3, the idea is to measure the changes in resources in their physical units,
e.g., labor hours, CPU hours, etc. Then in Stage 4, we attempt an explicit valuation of
these resource changes. Of course, we may deliberately exclude some of the resource
changes from this valuation. For example, as long as the replatformed SCAN meets the
desired maximum access time requirements, we may not place an explicit value on the
system's actual access time. On the other hand, certain changes that could not be
measured (such as better quality of information) could now be explicitly valued at least
in subjective terms by the users of that infommtion. This is possible as long as we do not
insist on valuing everything in dollar terms. Thus, at least until Stage 6, some changes
may be valued in dollars while others are valued on a "user satisfaction scale" of 1 to 10,
etc.
Separation of valuation from measurement is critical in the multi-perspective
analysis I am proposing. It allows us to recognize that different stakeholders value a
given change in resources very differently. For exmnple, from a cost-plus-fixed-fee
contractor's point of view a cost saving has no positive or negative value. For an empire-
building manager, the reduction in the manpower under his supervision has a negative
value. If a fixed G&A pool will be collected by the contractor by the end of the year,
regardless of the direct labor hours involved, should not G&A be left out of the rate
NASA uses to value each labor hour saved? The proper labor rates to use in Attachments
B, C, and D can be arrived at, only when issues of this sort are resolved.
For many other resources such as computer hardware or office facilities, market
prices are coxmnonly seen as an "objective" source of value. However, economists point
out that market prices are not value-free; they derive from a particular income
distribution and from existing institutional and legal arrangements. As such, at times it is
necessary to adjust market prices to reflect specific stakeholders values. For certain
benefits, such as the improved quality of decisions supported by an ASW, market prices
may not be available and valuation must be imputed from the relevant stakeholder's
beliefs, attitudes, and preferences.
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Clearly, a number of assumptions are required in this valuation stage, and we
must not forget to update our list of explicit assumptions. Sometimes, during valuation
we realize that somethhags we had originally decided not to measure can and need to be
measured. Thus, there may be a feedback from this stage to Stage 3.
In Stage 5, the explicit values must be adjusted for the timing and uncertainty of
their occurrence. It is in tiffs Adjustment Stage that we must also adjust for the
probabilities of existence of the co-producers of our benefits. These adjustments often
require assumptions regarding discount rates and the various stakeholders' risk
preferences. Thus, once again, we must update our list of assumptions. Finally, in this
stage we must also conduct a sensitivity (i.e., what-if) analysis considering alternative
values for the various assumptions, e. g., alternative discount rates, alternative timings of
occurrence of particular events.
At the conclusion of Stage 5, the analyst's task is complete. In Stage 6, the
decision-maker(s) must consider the valued and the unvalued together from each
stakeholders point of view to arrive at the final assessment of an ASW alternative.
Sometimes this Final Assessment Stage may provide a clear decision regarding the
funding of the project, and sometimes it may lead to a redesign of the ASW project under
consideration to make it more attractive to one or more stakeholders. In the latter case,
we may have to repeat the entire process beginning with Stage 1.
2.4 Implementation Requirements and Advantages
From the many analytical issues I have identified, it should be clear that the
conduct of this methodology cannot be left to the software engineers of an ASW project.
The methodology must be guided by a person who is knowledgeable in the underlying
philosophical, economic, and financial principles. This person would need the advice and
cooperation of people familiar with contract terms and accounting systems, in addition to
the advice and cooperation of the major stakeholders of an ASW project. The first time
we apply this methodology, these requirements may seem prohibitively expensive and
time consuming. However, once the first full study is complete, the methodology will be
easy to apply to other ASW projects since a number of complicated measurement and
valuation issues may be already resolved.
I think that an investment in this methodology will pay back many times over
through better decision-making at KSC. As suggested in the foregoing discussion, the use
of this methodology will also provide the following additional by-products:
(i) No additional efforts needed to justify the decisions to extem',d bodies,
(ii) Better product designs of the ASW under consideration,
(iii) Greater cooperation and commitment to the ASW project from the multiple
stakeholders,
(iv) Greater chance of on-schedule and successful development and implementation,
and (v) Knowing the co-producers of our ASW's benefits may help us work on
improving the probabilities of existence of those co-producers.
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3. A Review of the Current CBA Practice at KSC
Before I say anything else, I must say that I appreciate the willingness of the
authors of the CBAs in attachments A through D to subject their studies to a
methodological review. Given that they had no background or training in the relevant
philosophical and economic issues, I admire their creativity and courage in authoring
these studies. I mean no harm or insult to these authors when I point out the conceptual
errors in their methods. I particularly a&nire them for recognizing, on their own, that
most of their numbers were simply wild guesses, and that the margin of error in their
esthnates was perhaps very large. I am most encouraged to find that these authors are
higlfly interested in obtaining the necessary background, and in developing a better
methodology for the future.
In Section 2, I have already commented on many specific conceptual issues in the
studies represented in Attactunents A to D. I will be happy to provide additional detailed
colmnents and suggestions to the authors, if they so desire. However, here I want to
review the overall practice of CBAs at KSC. In the light of my proposed methodology,
we can observe many deficiencies in the current practice. However, two important
deficiencies seem to be the root causes of the rest of them.
First, CBAs are not done to actively assist the decisions at hand. Instead, they
seem to be produced for public relations (i.e., justification of past decisions), or
documentation requirements (in the justification of a preferred decision). In project
review meetings I observed, CBAs were often introduced casually with phrases such as
"now let us see where we are going with our numbers." In other words, they are given
little credibility, and practically no scrutiny.
Indeed, at KSC, I have observed instances where managers facing complex
problems deliberately avoided CBAs. I believe that this practice is based on the many
misperceptions of what a CBA is, and how it can assist decision-making, discussed
earlier. I hope this report helps correct that misperception. At the same time, as I will
explain in a minute, given the current state of CBA practice at KSC, these managers were
fully justified in avoiding CBAs.
Second, the conduct of CBAs is left to the initiative of software engineers who
have little background, training, or assistance in the pertinent methodology. Thus, each
study seems ad hoc, developing its own methods and concepts. Indeed one engineer
suggested that it was KSC's standard operating procedure "to build a brand new road
every time we want to go to Orlandol"
Each one of the available studies seems to violate one or more of the fundamental
principles of the CBA methodology. None of the studies I examined tried to capture all
the costs and benefits, as is required by the methodology. None of them made all of their
underlying assumptions explicit, or esthnate probabilities that the explicit assumptions
will be valid. Most studies did not seem to use proper base-lines or proper projection
methods in the measurement of their costs and benefits. They failed to separate
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measurement from valuation, and to address the many issues of valuation from the
perspective of the multiple stakeholders. Even the more commonly understood practices
of the CBA methodology, such as adjustiag for time value of money in a multi-year
stream of costs and benefits, were not used in the CBAs at KSC.
In short, the current practice is seriously deficient.
Speaking as a professor, I am sorry, but I must assign an F grade to this practice.
At the same time, I must add that despite this team grade, most individuals who are
involved in the current practice of CBAs get unqualified A grades. These individuals
have been doing their parts sincerely and to the best of their abilities. They have also
been very cooperative and candid with me and open to my ideas. As will be clear below,
the deficiencies of the current practice are not the fault of any individual.
3.1 The Vicious Circle
As I think about the two root causes of deficiencies together, I have come to
realize that we are caught in a vicious circle which can be described as below:
Available CBA studies measure only selected (not all) changes brought about by the
development and implementation of a given ASW. At times, they force
quantification of the non-quantifiable, or prediction of the unpredictable. The
baselines used in the measurement are often incorrect. Measurement (in physical
units) is not separated from valuation. Valuation is from a single (as against each
stakeholder's separate) point of view. Values are not adjusted for their probabilities or
timing of occurrence. Sensitivity analysis is not done. In short, many principles of the
CBA methodology are violated.
As a result,
The focus of the CBA studies is primarily on the quantifiable. Very hnportant but
non-measurable costs, benefits, and risks are left out. The margin of errors in the
quantified estimates is very large. The real values of the Agency mission, the values
of senior managers, the values of the contractors, etc., are not captured by the
analysis.
Then,
• Because CBA s do not capture and address the real values and issues, and because the
studies' estimates are unreliable, Management looks at CBAs not as decision-making
tools, but as mere exercises in generating numbers for external justification of
decisions already made.
Thus,
• Management allocates few resources, and leaves the conduct of CBAs up to the
initiative of the software engineers involved in specific projects.
Next,
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Lacking resources, and the necessary expertise in economic analysis, but with vested
interests in justifying their projects, courageous software engineers use creative, but
ad hoc and unsound, methods to conduct their CBAs.
But this results exactly in the situation described in the starting bullet of this process, and
the vicious circle continuesl
Figure 2 depicts this vicious circle graphically.
.....4¢
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The Vicious Circle
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Available CBA studies measure only selected _
(not all) changes brought about by !.hedevelopment
and implementation of a given ASW...Attimes, they
force qualification of the non-quantifiable, or prediction
of the unpredictable. The baselines used in the •
measurement are often Incorrect. Measurement (in
physical units) is not separated from valuation.
Valuation is from a single (as against each
stakeholder's separate) point of view. Values are not
adjusted for their probabilities or timing of occurrence.
Sensitivity analysis Is not done. In short, many
principles of he CBA methodology are violated.
The focus of the CBA studies is
primarily on the quantifiable. Very
important but non-measurable cost,
benelits, and risks are left out. The
margin of errors in the quantified
estimates is very large. The real values
of the Agency mission, the values of the
senior managers, the values of the
contractors, etc., are not captured by
the analysis.
Lacking resources, and the necessary
expertise in economic analysis, but
with vested interests in justifying their
projects, courageous software engineers
use creative, but ad hoc and unsound,
methods to conduct their CBAs.
Because CBAs do not capture and address
the real values and issues, and because
the studies' estimates are unreliable,
management looks at CBAs not as decision-
making tools, but as mere exercises in
enerating numbers for external
stification of decisions already made.
Management allocates few resources,
and leaves the conduct of CBAs up to
the initiative of the software engineers
involved in specific projects.
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4. Conclusion and Recommendations
I have argued that ASW investment decisions are multi-stage, varied, complex,
risky, and controversial. Therefore, we need a systematic methodology to assist rational
ASW investment decisions. I proposed a formal, explicit, and multi-perspective cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) methodology for this purpose. I outlined a number of rich
concepts and principles of this methodology, and described a six-stage process for its
hnplementation. In the light of this methodology, we reviewed the current practice of
CBAs at KSC.
Although I have concluded that current practice is seriously deficient, I believe
that most NASA employees already knew that, and many are looking forward to
improving that practice. I think my principal contribution is the identification of the
vicious circle we are in, and consequently, my prhnary recormnendation is:
Break out of that vicious circle.
The methodology I have proposed provides one exit point to break out of this
circle. The other exit point is a change in management's perception of what a good
methodology can do, and its willingness to provide adequate resources and appropriate
expertise to the conduct of CBAs.
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eATI'ACHMENT A
Excerpts from a CBA of SCAN Replatforming
c99ea and Bane f£t_
5.1 _ ....... re difficult to
ormin o_ _urlfor the replatf g d with mandated
mhe benefits . --_--=_il" associate J _ n_F
"'" • use tlley are pL+,,.---- J O towaro _-= v__
quantify b °ca The lanned migratl n _ur ent SCAN
changes co bSDH_-! make p a number oy Y"'.__Z-Z_Ic h means
operatt.g aysteg__* _i.e DaN, Dialog) o_'e_e""necessity
software compo--- _.Ired. However, wx_- _ .... F
that replatforming Is r-,- the opportunlty for a Ouflu_u_
or replatfor,.Ing___°me_o t_ ay_em thatwillbe _ge _o_
_ignificant improvements commu:ity. The main benefits cu _
benefits to the user
realized by the new system are as follows.
resyno/ engineers wi_l be able to perform
He required immediately after accessing the system. Also,as
useful work collection and no checkpoint operatiOnS
no garbage
required by the LISP langua9 e"
A single on-line database which wilt make all data
available to the users at all times and elimination of the
need to reconstruct a new KB for each mission.
Elimination of KB builds will also mean that system
engineers will have access to modified circuitry as soon
as EO modifications are entered.
Elimination of unused repo_ts and replacement with reports
that are more in line wlth the needs of the user
CommUnitY,
A-l
initial estimates indicate that SCAN replatformlng will beThere are a numbe_ of key issues
undertaking, functionality make
an ex enaive slums ofich _.st be resolved and _h?__ _-s_. The ma_or ele,.ent o_
W it t orming a non-ggxv*a_. _- __..elo_ment ' although
_he r-p1%_ --sooiated with so,tws_e?:l--t_tlonaa .el_ as
cost WtXA _" _" e accrued Dy _pAm,,-,. __d in the
ine COSTS will b_ - estimates are u"_--- ___.o i,_
;_vised running coat-. C°atcAsE Methods estimatXon _u_ ....
following sections using
conjunction with the best data available at this time
vole _ent Coeg _etisatee5.2.1 De P _ . °---- a_e best
• of re latform_ng _'
,, develo ment cost P rlmarY development stages
[he .P_- F_rma of tile four p ..... e Analysts,
understoou *_--_--_hodS. TheSe stage,_ -_ -_=-es a_e
aeau_ On t_e u==
DeSign, Build asd Documentation.
described below with manpoWe_ estimates based
info%matlon avaltable at this time.
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The Analysis stage will verify the findings from the
strategy Stage and expand them into sufficient detail to
ensure system accuracYe feasibility and a sound foundation
for design.
The Design Stage will take the detailed requirements from
the Analysis Stage and find the best way to fulfill them
and achieve agreed service levelS, given the technical
environment and previous decisions on required levels of
automation, using
The Build stage will code and test programs,
appropriate tools. TheSe depend on the technical
environment and types of programs involved.
The Documentation Stage Will deliver user manuals and
operations hand-over documentation, which must be
sufficient to support the system testing tasks in the
concurrent build stage,
The current manpower estimates associated with the described
tasks are as follOWS (calendar weeks equals total man-weeks
divided by 4,2/ current manning level).
See APPENDIX A.3 Hanpower Analysis summary, for details.
Total man-days|
Analysis Stage Total man-weeks# ---_
Calendar weeks| __ll---
Total man-daYS! -_
Design stage Total man-weeks| -J_
Calendar weeks;
Total m_n-days; __11S---
Build stage Total man-weeks! -_
Calendar weeks; --_
Total man-days= ___tO----
Documentation Stage Total man-weeks;
Calendar weeks; ____l---
indication that the
The primary impact of this analysis is an the original
replat forming may not be achieVa_:olP er current manningmanning date is a
schedule at the current
levels indicate that a February 1994 completion
more reasonable estimate. To meet the planned schedule of a
July 1993 completion date would require increased manpower as
follOWS!
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analysls
Design
Build-Dec
See Appendix
Hilestoneae for
manpower requirements.
5.2.2 Xmpiomen_tlon S0tlmatos
implementation estimates will depend
which have not been made at this time.
will also be associated with the
discussed in section 4,_.3,
5.2.3 _unnln9 Cost Estimatee
5,6
4,6
8,2
A. 4 s p reposed Development Schedule and
schedulin9 implications of .the estimated
on hardware decisions
Impl_mentation costs
transition methodology
Runnin9 cost estimates should be reduced elgnificantly
because of the elimination of the Knowledge ease build tasks
currently performed by Data Bank. _unning co0t_ will also be
modified by the maintenance level _equired on any new
hardware. _unning costs may be increased by additional
backup requirements imposed on LSDN, which may be required to
reliably suppOrt the planned ILOBMS.
while all run cost data is not available at this time, is is
that the replatformed system will present a net
expected in operational runnln@ costs.decrease
5.3 C °st/sane_It Fnal_mlJ
The analysis of coats vevsu_ benefits is virtually impossible
context of SCAN platforming, for a nu._er of
in the The _eplatforming is mandated by software
tl,e benefits to be gained are not easilyreasons, this time.
obsolescence, . -= the _-ts are unknown at .
" e and some u_ _-- ...... e_latforming will be
quant_abl ..... _ted XS t_ac _.o _ _ ___ _ 9 I To
Tire best that c9" Y"='ZS the estimates in secciu" _l_ _ that
siva as inQlcatgo u¥ .... _--e it must be reme._=_
expen Xn per_P =_+" ' for the sCAN system tokeep these costa
it has taken more than fiVe years
achieve its current level of functionality, including effort
associated with approMimately 300 problem Beports. The costsrecognition that SCAN is
• udod in these estimates are a
=n_l a complex system and they also represent a commitmenttem coded correctly the first
st ..... renlat_ormed #ys ., ==-_ _;ll continuQ the
@SO EOr _'°°*_
time and. r_ _-- -n-inee_in9 workload.
reduce _ne _yScom _
V"
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qATTACItMEHT B B- 1
Costs BenefiU Analysis |or lh¢ D¢ploymen¢ of Ih¢Test Engineer (KATE)
Knowledge Ilased Autonomous
INTRODUCTION i of ©lcctromcchanical and fluid systems
for health monitor n._ • cs Ca abilities cx!stKATE is a tool • • a nosin fadur©caus • P .
• CA:tiff , isolalln and at g g [of use wllh Shuttle.
tic coat.lion of faiim , is[ton m r_n .,_. ......
for automa ,_ .._,,.a,.. d©vcloomc.t of t C_. +. v.c .._. nt s stem (VilMS).
Cu[[c.I wo_tL .,v,.-_- _,i_ce 'l Vehicle ticazm mm,agcm¢ Y
Room Integration console cn,,._-.r
iS for the complolo deplo;ymcnt of KATE
_";If|ll ]_{_il| ei|Vl.lUllll " C |aGo ratc(] IJllIO illla $till© the g ....... A *SSUlllnllOflS war I_.. ,,: ...... ,_"SS COnUOi arid
forecasts, r_vc.r.al car=.-, "'" "mere ;rid deplo mcnt o.I In t?:?_"' v_l'_,a needed for a
too,it©ring syszc,-a ,-- ' 1 "---
detailed Cost benefits analysis either does not exist or is ,- a,
• is difficult to obtain. With that staled, this analysis for KATE must I_ v:cW_ulativ¢ study of costs and I_¢nclttS o[ l!:¢
which It " d nd spcc • " Dollar
• -, a ualtta vc a isled uemtttativc
as bc|ng, in It s essc,cc, .. quj,, it wlul felt sufficient cost data ¢x q
KATE system, in a_a= w. .... . those lueas whcr¢ insufficient cost dala
olatcd fiom thls data. For ' umcnts. Th¢ derivation
values were ex_alp as derived horn p,l.auslbtlily arg t..._a_, ,_f this text and
• ted & Uafl|llatlV¢ CSIIIT_I¢ W_ ._ , .... lefl oUISKI¢ Of the lllam u,.,_ --
c_'sal I d,oqc_sl bcitfllt values navo u,,,,.. ,,,-,
rcsid¢ as appcndicics at th© end of thll rcporl.
ASSUMPTIONS
I. "lllis analysis does not take into account the validation costs for KATE dcploym.cnt.
lids is du¢ to the fact dial at the present Om¢ no decision has bccn made conc©mmg
the methodology to Ix: used in validating non-GOAL. Firing Room resident
applications.
2, This analysis docs not lake into accoun! any transition Costs other than estimates for
uaining costs incl,dcd into assumption # 3.
Since st dl0 cuffcnt lime only one Shuttle system I!as bo¢.nlmplcmenlcd in KATE
(KATE-LOX) a linc_ ¢xlrapolation of costs is ¢stinzatc(l lOt an expansion In the3.
economy of scale from one application to a ruing room wide syslcm.
4. A me_ur© of modelling complexity for t particular Shutdc systcm is defined as
tl,¢ number of Fu,cdon Designators (FDs) associated with that system.
time is iv©n as 8 _/FD. Tidt _ssumpdon is basra
•-..-s of model develop _meal t_ __g .... .-o,-anuncr (|.©. this Inca,des ti,c dmc
5. A ,,,..- m'¢ . ..... ....,.. hr.© -Iv,. v-'-'l,"
on experience anu it_a--.,.- - KJ_I I_ p
ncc_©U_rY to l©p.rn and model in KATe).
6. 11_© labor rat¢ Is d¢find M 40.00 $/_r, ( appro_tmat© L,SOC rate).
_t
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ORIC)NAL P g_F. ;_
OF POOR QUALIT_
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
B-2
IMMEDIATE BENEFITS ( < 3 yra)
I. KATE can draw conclusions on system behavior, both current and futm¢, based on
men! in ui. Upon operational activation, for the integration
analysis of measure P " c r flow may be realized duc to
• 150,000 rvcl,ci pc . . .
on.solo alone savings of @ $1. __PC_., _^. Adh. ,.mmtonne oocrauons (now
,_,--_ tess suuDort ©ngincc_s Dcmg.rcquu_-,,a ,m y,-,, .. ........_,-i..%2o3 shifts per day
_".... • " -" ---. -'- _ .... 1¢ ha£exJ 0 ] on-siaUofl ©flgillr,4;tlD wuJ_..B . , r -_ ._
acdv¢ 1¢stmg). i ms ._- ...... n based n six flows per year, wou,u ¢qualc w
at 60 days per Ilow. Tmal cost savings, ----- o_
$ 900,000 per year.
Po'rENTIAL BENEFITS ( >3 yra)
.
..... ,. t.-,.t. ,.o. be tise.,d for multiple subsystems by
KAI_ re resents oac.analyUcal I_: w[,,_,':_T2" o,,a .-_ivsis Cost savings at0 in
..h..,,.in_Ph¢ Imowlcdg¢ base usca im _aa._--:l_ -.-_ --,'--,__ _.,_,, for each class of
L-.."0t_*"m " . ..... 1._,, etnt, P nnlv II10 ILllOWlg, uS_" t_a_v *' *i0 fflClt¢ ¢ll.v m.-,_, ,'.. j • . • • "roduccd syslcm u ovcl p. . , :r ..... _. ,..,_, ,.,vi as lu'© in sustaining ongincctang,
s.,stcat needs to u¢ acvclop0a, b.? _,I'.,_ _":,'TvL_)gs.-.stcms
s_ac© th© same reasoning soflwar¢ IS usco mr- it. au ? •
_2;I Estimated Cosl ExoendimrCs
Th© costs in dcvcloping a total KAT.E. F".t_g Ro_)m s.yst.c.m. ( including knowlcdgc
bases for each Shutdc system as wet| as me tg.A tt_ snc, ) _s oslhnatcd to bc
@ $ 30 Million.
• i ides curr©nd rcsiding in GOAL pertain .on!y to _..n.trol and
Nolo that the cap a.b.! ,----_,_ _TE would have those wire mo admuon oi
monitoring capabUtUOS, w-o-; .......
diagnosd0 capabilid©s.
x.... ¢
2.2 Estimated Cost S avines
Sustaining onginccring costs for a fully deployed KATE syslom, on a pcr year basis
arc csdmatcd to be @ $ 5.67 Million.
Note that this sustaining engineering cost ©sdmat© is tpprO. _imatcly
.. • costs for sustaining tho cuncnt complement of GOAL
n_aintaining _.round softwlu© that may be realized at©
@ $ 2.33 Mt||ion.
Fu • - ircdto rfoa_a..,:-.--. --,-, S I .
s stem cngmccnng.tauor _ ul...:_,,._.,_,.,.,-_,hen fi dins doricconcerning
, i,,tonancoopc..,ons. ....... or.st.
.. • a ndix B )a 13 % ir.ducdon in n.mn-.powcr ma...Yobercal_z_blc
advisory sys_ms (sc¢ .ppC_u. .... Z,,o. ,,,a.ates tO tODroxtmat|cy It _vu,i_= ,,- * •
without impairing r_xcty, s,s._ ,.,-,,,i..-i .... --
MilLion per y©ar.
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"ll,c total costs savings Ihat maY bc fealizc.d on a yc_zly basis is cstimatcd to bc
@ $ 7.95 l_llion per year,
Olher Benelll_
"on can I_ used for _al tt.n_ data analysts or as a . .
stem VerSt uatton. Costs savings axe realized
Tile same KATFJsY . . d off-line system oval ...... r,,, neradons and training
3. °;,-,,lation tool for uatnmg an , ._:_;..o 5cna_at¢ SolIWm_ ,v. 0 r-
_"' .... - ...... 4tu O[ IZlalfiUttm"'b r
by dcletin$ m© orgy., :
_dvid©8 t* is cu,tnd)' done.
.
Reduction in the siz_ of launch team for all other consoles based on th© same radonal
Its used in Ill $ _t2.2 tbov_.
B-3
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APPENDIX A
CONSOLE
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
C7
C8
C9
ClO
INTO
CII
C12
FO
8000
5600
5600
2400
6500
5100
5900
6400
4200
2000
7O00
I 0,000
8 hrlfd
64,0O0 hrs
44,800
44,800
19°200
52,000
40°800
47,200
5 I,200
33,600
16,000
I
I 12,000
I
160,000
RATE
@ 40.00 $1hr
TOTAL
B-4
COST/CONSOLE
$ 2.56 M
1.7gM
1.79 M
0.77 I1
2.08 M
1.63 M
1.89 I'1
2.05 I"1
1.72 I"1
0.64 M
4.48 I"1
6.40 I"1
$ 27.80 I"I
ESTIMATED COSTS FOR KNOWLEDGE BASE DEVELOPMENT
I .
Tl_iS estimate was doubled to take Into account the uncertainty
In developing KATE applications Involvong high-speed.digital systems.
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CONSOLE
C2
£3
C4
C5
C6
C7
C8
C9
ClO
INT6
ell
C12
TOT AL
SIZE
FD
8000 X _ 80,000 LINES
56,000
5600
56,000
5600
24,000
2400
65,000
q
6500
51,000
5100
59,000
5900
64,000
6400
42,000
4200
20,000
2000
70°000
7000
I 0,000 100,000
68,700 ' 4,081 K
B-5
KATE with control " Estimates Dased on experience with the KATE-ALO
system suggest a 15 _, increase In the amount of
code needed to reallze control procedures. "
4,081 K _, 15 _ " 4,963 K lines
ESTIMATED 51ZE OF TOTAL KATE C*+ APPLICATION
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su5TAINIH6 ENGINEERING
B-6
GoAL ESTLVIATES
7 MILLION LINES OF GOAL cODE (@)
I00 5/W ENGINEERS (@)
LSOC LABOR RATE " 40 $/hr
ONE MAN yEAR _ 2000 hr
5uSTAIIIIN6 l_liGllIE[RIN6
CO5T5 I_STIMATI_
-- 2000 hrS X
40 $/hr X 100 _ $ B,O00,O00 $/Yr
7°000,000 lines
1.143 S/line
KATE £STII'IATE
4,963,000 lines X
1.143 S/lIne "
5,670,000
$/Yr
poTENTIAL NET SAVINGS
8,000,000 $1YR - 5,670,000 $/YR
2,330,000 S
IYR
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Excerpts from a CBA of OPSS
ATTACHMENT C
C-1
I. Tile dally sclledullno meetings were considerably sholtened. If the dally scheduling meeting
would have been lleld using the non-Al sclledule, appfoxlmalely 83 lioufs el meeting lime would
Ilavo bee. expended lot Ihe enlke flow. Howevm. because el Ilia use el Ihe AI based scheduler.
u,ly 42.03 flouts wine spenl, yielding a savings el aboul 40.23 Iloufs. Based on e tale el
$341m lot eacll el tile 106 ellglnee=s thai attend Ills meetings. Ilia use el the GPSS schedule
gesulled In a savings el about $144.9118 (See attacl,nenI I) Im the engineers' lime along will=
a savings el about _t2.000 Iol tile poison who used Io pllyslcally "lay tape" lot tile paper
sclledutaS.
e lime Is expensive but oils.
e. Weekend ov f tams) leclmlcians
_ , e,,,,matlo.o, weekendo Tps O,e,,.alptolecllo..,sys:, ,-..,
2 Heducllof ........ ,nora cosily urn=;=.. : .... ..,m udn tills IlOW u==o- -.-
.,;,_o a_v Io prevem --"','.'. ,,..._,, lot te ulteO uv.,.,...-- d g
.._._ ss .i._ _p S scneuum, ,'.' v"ed q 950 on ovmtima. By ullltztng
ollllZeU i.u .._.S oak Ilow TP8 spoilt _481. Tills tesullS In a cost
• all dudng a 16 w of leclinlclan suppofl, s able Io
,.n= iguralion. No!m ..Y ,_a was actually spent I ..... ,-.,.ed because GPSS wa el
_l;_,llt_pS S scheduler }= 'u._..""..t'=',_enI 2). Tile _evlngs w== - .... due Io belier iolocasllllg
.... , .-_'1. R_) I l_@O =1t =L'''''' InslallCes
5Ltvlli_S OI _J/t, ....
i.edic I weekend ovefltlne arid reduce of altlolnala Ill some
conlllcls.
Total cost savings Io_ 6TffSO. or-t02 ate estimated at $528.809.
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ATI'ACHMENT D D-I
flUaXCOH eO_T MIMoYaI8 BTU_Y
am all aspe0tl CO dQ_ormtne if tim
t UDICOIt cogtcept fr on _lt_o CCH_i 2 oa
_vat.uate_cl.o._. ........._" a.,d ..b.equa.t tm@ta,.e,tC_t .... t,,."k for
COOtt:tO|U@O. Cl@vwsu_w_w_._.ot'_.,, ill_ W IL provttle a (:out- t'--_r ,-,.C
watt an 0aim o|ttuw -,,--- ......e .... i, _
al_utt Le opern_ion0.
A. ItUftlCOtl doVeIopiaenU will contiliue tit the dLrection described
be | oW •
o Tim DI,_S displays and code will be used an tim RUBICON DPB
liylitela .re.tier. LCC z etjolutlo., HlYF, D_U dump analyzer slid
oilier aiialysI0 applicac[ostn will run u.de_ the system monitor.
The folloWi.g ltei.n are platted got lntplemelttation in F¥93t
o Dt.E_ taunt be imdkfied to allow tnultiple applications to _un
nit rim same mac|title a.d tltomt will become ItUBICOtt.
o 'l'lto Hwr CL, I P_] portion will be t.corporated to run under this
flew ItUDICOH syOtem.
o Witore teanible0 tim software developed b_, IlockwelI will bo
.ctttsad laH. ";_ keyn_roken|.
o ItUblCOH stunt be converted to run under HOTIF,
tim dLreetton system
Future ptann/capabitittelz will depend o.
emt(jiitoering decidou to bent uutt uentiit0 iteedo.
II. 'i'llo i,nltttgel,eltt Iortueo [or allowing vehicle ._nltoring from a
re.tout location (outside tits Flri.g Root,t} Will be worked.
C. Tim traimmieni°n of dace [l:Oln all 4 vehicles on a single network
weft be completed slid validated. Thin in currently scheduled to
b_ co.,pints a¢oumtd tile mid-t993 timefram.e.
D. 'r|te etlternet .etwork uued for the tra|mmtenton of vehicle data
(31|d workntacio, to workaLation co,mau.icatto, will be fully
,._k.t_aknod attd oupported,
262
oN.NAt P_ _
Of: IM)OR QUALITY
RUBICOH CO_T _AI_¥_IB aTUDT
D-2
!TI: eo I'rzYS cOaT A Y!X s-
A. Opt|mlzatlofl o1_ manpower reao_l:oea
l)encription! ltUI_ICOH call ba uoed either in the office or In one
Fit co u_i, itor all 4 veltLclea duciltg tlmea ol_ vehicle
power-u|* HOH[TOR OHb¥ aupporE. It ia eatimar-ed tltac
D|'5 Let In _ li_nl¢ol: only ilK}de approz,r, in,_r.e]LY 05% Of
tlm rime cite vellicle i_ powered up.
I'.:,r SavingrJ! $2?4,000 (4 eltq _ _3 _/|_llc l( 40 I_r/wk _ 52 wka|.
DPS cuCt-eltl:lY fzUppolFtQ vehZcle power up perLoda 3
ezltLftn a day wiLIt 4 eltgineerlz on I_lz"lzt artier..! 4 on
uecoizd l]ltift a.d 2 on chicd ehit¢ toc a total ot upCall be utItlzed as a
to I0 peopie a deF. RUfllCON
,.e_l,od {o_ _urvivabLlltY by DPS hardware eltglneera
co co.cil=ue vehicle gupporc wl_elt ahul;l_le budget
CLIEbt_C_I I _lli[l_C[ _|,e I' ulOb@l: OE nyl3Cem el|g tlteeL°l_ lit
cite gEoup. Tim number o[ engiltee¢l| auppo_Clng
vel_Iclo _enC_itU could be ,educed to 2 people per
_ltift [or a toC_tl o1_ 6 people _ day W[tltout
ImpacCiit_ velticte Ce_r.litg.
B. Avoid opening u|megeeearY I_R'a
i)eacripcton; /_no._loue co.dlClona that- have been eeen before and
documeetced o. _to, IPR cm, happen agAllt at- a ]._l:el_
date. Wit:i, .o IPIt/PR ltiar..ory dace _eadily available,
1PR'_ c_- be opelted on_Y co be _eae_c|led Io.O
eitou(Jh to [illd our- t|tat r-|te p¢oblem Waa _eell before
a.d |u eli ezq_lai.lted co_ld_C[o.. 'l'lte eltglneer muur.-
tl,elt cloae cite IPI1, als _tt explaii,ed condlEloo.
Eur _avi,g01 _lS.O001yr
'l'ltere tia_ bee,, alt _ve_age ol_ approXlmat:elY 16
e_pl_ined co.dicion IPIt'a opelled pet" year (averaged
e_ra}. It. ia ear.imaced tha_ our. o1_
_ho_e _0 xr.. =.._=_:_ = 'l'l_eae p roblegu_ were. oz_,.,,==,_.avoided a pprox=,n=_==_. ;_n,,= or lie data In the =tu--_..
dd_e/_ned oz, prev_uu:, _-,, " .... ..,^.-o,-,.,,,.i the o_oblem alto
G.%_. _caba0e could h_ve ite/peu u,,u==._- ...... " opel. and
_v_, ,-_, _._. avoid opeltx.g an IPR The eoti_r.ed co_C to
_"'-_..__ cloue a, iP_ io _2,000 ('l'|iia l_igu¢e doea not l.clude
.... ' Life t=i,.e required r.o inveatigat;e t;Ite problem) •
c. Volant:tel  voida||0e ot an unneoe    ¥ launoh
l)eucriptiOlt$ If rite tlme remaining in tl_e launch window la at,oft=
b_" providing a quick, pzeciae explanation or wo=k-
a_ou.d procedure {or air bCC violntion (one tl_t ca=,
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be ratio.alized a0 being OK to launch given certai.
coltdiLiol|_l _re me_) Cha_ would allow klm count to
reou,.o quickly you could preclude =it unnecaooary
lau,ich acrub,
l.:ac 9avingel h mil|llnUllt 9[ million aaVlltge would be reeiLzed.
D. 1.radoott betweelt 00_14 vereee ngDIOOH mL.tenanoe for PP8 8yutem
dL,pLe¥ mo,tLto_Lnu.
l)eucrlptLoii! Circe ItUOICON i_ incorporated |lifo C12 appllcatlo.
oof_ware Lit CC.HB 2. approxlnm|;eY 12 OOhb dLaplay
p_ograi,m wLll no longe_ be required.
,rliuo, Lira i,_Incenence Hmnpowar raquL;od on tl;a GO/_b
Oio_¢ware can be redirected Co ii_iltCain the _tUBICON
ay_tem i,_.Icor i_ofCware,
EaC 5avingal No coaC eavinga but no additional coat incurred,
k-v
B. Improved training I_or new ItLIrem
Deacriptlon# Hheit new Itlree are b_ought on board tliey currently
i.uaC gO I_ltrough excena_ve ¢ra_nlng. Hlch Che record
alid playback and debugger capabllLCie¢l, e,igLneern
c_It be Crailled Ua_ltg accua|, v@ll[_le dace tO gee all
uitderi_l_ltdLnq o_ |tOW. ClIo DPS f/y/_Cem woKke, _'oilurea
ca,t alao be lnaarced to I;e_ _eacCione to p_oblema. rol.
'l'ltia capal)LtLcy ia eUlpporced cocally aeperaCe
Cite CCHS MaC CliMe _veLd_,ltg achedu|.li_g ¢onEliccl_ alld
reducLHg the Lmp_cl: oil oclter ay_el,m,
On tile _o_cware development aide, ino_t computer
rel_ced degreefl require C a_ _ progr_ll_nlltg language.
Hew Iti rea ca, be ll_[e productive in a much ahorCez"
I: [llte i_ r¢_l.O,
E_E 5aViligfl| |]avlng/_ i_ Itard ¢o determine but hae the poCentlal
be a l_ ig _1_ f italic alltOUlit, ..
F. o_icelFLring' Roo_ tool to reduce the time It taken to _ltd
i_Lutor_cal L.toc_t io,.
De_=criptio.# IPlllPfl i_IntorlcaI data and cite PtlH must often be
[e0eazched to _uppozt aiWthLng _[om general
managemenC que_cionalconcerlta to t_oubleoiiootLng
probleam. By aearciting a quick eocene d_Cabaae for
cite required informacio, you ca. reduce tl_e ._npo_er
re,luLred Co p_ovLdo the neceuaa_. _' lnfo[maCioJi.
_,lC SUViltga! _L3,0001yearEuCll,_t:ed 15 _zyatem engineera apandLng .5 hOUra per
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week oearctzL.g docu.mnr.a che_C _:e_j.de _n the p.UBZCOH
dal_abano, The cLtne required co /jearch ¢|te PHW o-
_pecLrLc I:.opLC ¢o_" a_i.pl.O c_vt .bq reduced by e_ much
al3 20 IO[IIUEOLI.
= or new epproeahe# pod zepabLILtle= for CON8 2.
O. -p_tii tiltder f .... =_t.. and a,mlyata can be =
_.0 ItKJIla'l'Wm'_''l" . _ _,,O¢_u|lta'Nl''w
,.., Hew .,,:,,.e
i)elsCr-m.--- ceaV.ed =lid ?VC_L_'_'_.A nlfOVOll ill ¢..I_LU _v_._. CCHS 2
C_ll be devet°_uu-*_--_er and ectnee¢ *=_ _"'--e eeaLed
altv_.l[Oltl.elff-'' C°ltVUt'u;;_;ioUad =lld I_llt II1=" .... gfl
Du_ do .oC _ork c_ol
could be ¢_voided L. the CCH,.q 2 e0vL¢Ok.Ue"¢
Eac Savi.gat CCHq 2 will require a mal_a_ve leern:Lng curVe, h a_de
beuleftt: of clt[a elid ocher raim[ler VrojecCe will he
_ote¢ unde_cend_ttg oI_ l_ew app_oeche_ Co ayute0n
heal r-t= =houri t:o=: t.g.
...Petit fin der_ for ltew epproaehee and cepebtXt¢len for future
XaunOtt velttolea.
_- approactma _o ,_ntcortn,J and anatyete can be
I)enCripciou" Hew 5_O ,,v3_e e,ftcienC cectiniqueue°ceaued _=td evaluated, van in ohio environ=men _lmy
can be develOped_altO _= .... .t -_eLer in a ¢u_u_
• [',_e(l[_ISl;_ o=,_, "- -raelv, eechntquea
could bo uc_L .... ont. ConY-- - ---=d _hua
Iau,ch vehicle eutvt_o-.- "
¢.)t_C ace ¢.euEed DoU do tier.. _ork Calt be _tub,,,.
repeac tutg Elm aaate tai0cekea could be avoided in Elm
utew envir°ntaenc_tticlea will requi_e a aigni_tcau_c
Le_=ozzfzg__^ Lll be a r_a_ ,-_..t,,-, uctLLzXl_g
I_oH DPP IfO_CIt=u _" "
,or..er.e LI_ r.tte a_r-" |t_rdweee/_ol_C_ce po¢l_able
aol_cware ,v3dulea can be reuoed,.wLch aetna mL.or
,_dtl_tca_k°tta' gre_IY reduCtUtg eo_Cware developinenC
c L0,e/coa_tl,
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BU_ICON CO_? M_YBIfl BTUD¥
&. Dual maintenance of OOM4 dlnplaFe and BUUICON Bya_em Honitor.
l)_._.cript[oaL1 Duri.g t:h,e ci._{r_me frola October 1993 tintil CCHS
2 tu oper_1o.al, there wLII be inaLnlcenanoe
required on both the GOAt. ,iofcware aa well ae the
5yucem i_io.tCor porcton of ILUI_ICOH.
Coat IlapacC! $4.500/Fear
WIll ¢-e,iutre _pproK_i1_cely 50t i_nh6ur Increaae on
lItQlidI_Oly doOlyli ceilCe_ ch_llgQ p_cka_en. There were
26 ._.d&Lo_y change drLver_ (char impacted che 12
GOAt. d_nptaF pFoqrama chac Db_S can _eplnca| over
Lhe pa_£ 2 ye, re ¢o¢ a Coc_ o¢ 6pprox[llmCOly 550
il_iliioucfl. 'flit0 figure do0a .oc l,lc_ude clle l_CC
I_. AddiCio;ml _mineellnnce requl, l:od t:o m4tln¢_ilt ¢_I_I¥_ IfUleIo.
DeucrlpCton! /m addLcional .5 enQine_r would be requLred _o
,_ii_a/n elm exper¢ iw_Cem porc/o;t. (Not:el q'llia
_liC_.udea iil¢_[l_¢ll_ll(_ OIl Oh@ 14CC, H_ arid _in_ ol:.her
cblP_ _duto. I
Cofl_ ]lltpaeUl _)5,000/year
couC tn ._re l:Imn abno_bed
nut,her o¢ ny_cest engtneera
Ln _hi eeduoCLon, o_ the
required.
O. &ddt¢lonal
DeucripCion!
Co_U l.,pacC;
_alnCenanoe required _or dM;abaae.
Tllera will be a am_ll lncreaee in manpower required
Co t_tncain the dacabaae. IIowever, auUoN_cio_t
roucieteo will xmke ¢hia _nak n aimple procedure.
Dacabaoe rouCtliea can be run willie ocher caeka are
pe Iff o Ifmad.
' $2,lO0/yenr (8 flown/Fear x 8 hr/flow _ #33/hr)
Ic will c_ke _n eoCtt_ced 0 houra per f_ow Co
i,_i,,catn Clte datal_zae. With documeilca eli line there
wou|d be leoa need to l_nually update the paper
ve_:aio, of che document:0, /_ reduct.Lon in document
diecribucion Cali alao be realized _.e well aa
reducing uhe ait,3unl; of paper uaed.
.k,,., D. Additional work required to eat up additional CN tra0ktng
prooedu¢o_,
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Deucripl_/on!
Coot Iinl,)ac_ I
R. ottlce
Deucripcion!
Coat Impactl
The i,,[Cial developl,en_ of |:uloelguidellnen will be
a initti.m_ linpac¢. A.d £0 ALready I, work. 'rhia Would
be a oile CLo.o LmpacC LhclC could (Iiko _II ocher
proce_ae0) require periodic .K_dil_ioaclon.
No RUBICON cool; £1np¢Ct.
'l'lia o|,_rltCioiia| impact; io urlknotcn but: should nor.
requ[¢oa .£U,Ific_.l; Amount oI_ addLl;Lon_1 work.
(Noco_ 'PliLa caak will bo do.o l_or or.her ay.,r.e.ka
l;Itac are bel.g developed anyway. )
Imrdwnro _tntenance oonre o
,rite UNIX ._ch£nen u_ilLzed to _un flUaXCON o.taida
0¢ l;Ite CCH5 2 eltVlrOltllt@ltl; Would raquiK@ NiA[itl;elic_Itee
Exact cone in no_ known ot this ti_. _ha _ctual
doLl_r _._ui,l; wi},I be Inalgltl_ic_nl; hi.ca thar_ la
a large Mcale i¢_£11t;¢1_111¢_0 COlll;r¢tol; On l;|1@ Apollo's.
're da_a, .o repair cooC_ hay@ bean Incurred (_hii_
cover_ a period o¢ ¢_ppro)cl_ml;el¥ 2 ye_rni, plc_na
are Ill work I_o I_old v.|to _/nr.eittmce O_ l;hese
work_,caElo._ undal: Cite I..SDN I_lnCel|OltCe plan. 'rl+le
will provide quick _urn_round on |mrdwa¢'o proble.m.
_acC cone iU lto_ kno_t el; chiu time.
V. C_IV8 v_Itdat_on.
DeocriptiOnl TI_e v_lidacion o_ _hs C_IPS portion o_ RUBICON ia
unde_ review. HA dac_ exi_ca on _hia _t tills clme,
Co_ Ii.p_c_l _x_c_ co_ tn not known _t _hi_ timo,
I
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